Image credits: EPA_EFE / Ritchie B. Tongo

Through Naveed Qazi

INOT In October 2021, China flew its military planes about forty-nine times, trying to display its military might and thereby put pressure on the autonomous island. In response, Taiwan scrambled its own warplanes, and this scenario looked like a theater of war. The Taiwanese Defense Ministry described the current situation as the most serious in forty years.

Taiwan has separated from China since the start of the civil war in 1949. Domestically, military pressure serves Chinese President Xi Jinping’s propaganda and political agenda. Xi’s defining political idea is to promote the “Chinese dream” to his people, which means becoming “a strong nation with a strong army” in the future. The Chinese nationalist newspaper Global Times has even gone so far as to label the air raids as a “military parade” of the national day.

This escalation came at a time when the Chinese Communist Party is at a key time in terms of a leadership reshuffle. It will soon be holding its sixth plenum, a crucial meeting where the party’s heavyweights will discuss and build consensus on forming a de facto shortlist for the next generation of party leaders, which is expected to be installed by the end of 2022.

Wen-Ti Sung, in an Oped for The Conversation, commented: “At this critical juncture, as Xi faces internal dissent, a demonstration of muscular strength appears to be a natural instrument for generating pro-titular rallies around the flag feeling. ‘

Taiwanese had not been greatly alarmed by the increasing number of Chinese warplanes simply because of the familiar impact it had on them over time. People, in fact, have been used to this type of low-intensity Chinese military provocation. In fact, they have lived in the almost constant presence of Chinese military and diplomatic pressure for more than a quarter of a century.

It was in the run-up to Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996, when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army carried out massive missile tests in waters near Taiwan, which strongly hinted at a possible invasion. .

Since then, China has frequently held military exercises around Taiwan, including flying military jets around the island. These exercises aim to warn Taiwan against crossing Beijing’s “red lines”. To display this sense of aggression, Chinese State Television, for example, once released a video of the 2015 Zhurihe training exercises, which included footage of Chinese soldiers attacking a building that looked remarkably like the presidential office of Taiwan. China is also expanding its “gray zone war” against Taiwan, which includes cyber attacks and diplomatic isolation to undermine Taiwan’s resilience.

Another reason for China’s escalations is resilient local politics in Taiwan. When Tsai Ing-wen was first elected president in 2016, her domestic politics were seen as largely maintaining the status quo in Taiwan’s complex relationship with China. Abroad, it is associated with the promotion of a unique Taiwanese identity, distinct from its historical ties with China. His administration has also seen a push to revive the manufacturing of Taiwan’s national weapons, including locally made submarines, armored vehicles, and military planes.

Although China believes that Taiwan is part of its territory due to the 1992 consensus that was reached between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the Kuomintang Party (KMT) that then ruled Taiwan. The two sides disagree on the content of this so-called consensus, and it was never intended to address the issue of Taiwan’s legal status. In an Oped in Council for Foreign Relations, Lindsay Maizland wrote: “For the PRC, as Chinese President Xi Jinping said, the 1992 Consensus reflects an agreement that both sides of the Strait belong to one China and would work together to seek nationality reunification. For the KMT, this means something else, and not necessarily unification. ‘

For these reasons, according to General Qiao Liang, China must follow a plan of “strategic patience”, until the military balance shifts towards China. When this happens, China can use a military option by crushing Taiwan, and even deny any US intervention. Politically, it can even attract its young leaders, using the gravity of its economy. But economic incentives to replace soft power are something China lacks at the moment due to public mood.

However, the law of attraction through economic incentives conforms to Marxist logic, which is fundamental for Chinese communism. In this line of thinking, connections built on infrastructure for common economic interests are more enduring than connections based on a superstructure known as ideological or emotional alignment. This strategy asserts that the Taiwanese can let their guard down if they increasingly depend on Chinese trade.

Therefore, Taiwan must make sure to protect itself from any military escalation in one way or another. To protect its economy, it has also made sure to tighten investment laws for Chinese companies, especially for sensitive technologies.

What is interesting is that Taiwan has no allies other than the United States, but Japan is aware of the consequences of an American failure to defend Taiwan. Its ocean surveillance and coastal defense capabilities would be at risk if China took Taiwan. But the Japanese constitution prohibits getting involved directly in the defense of Taiwan, hinting at more trouble for Taiwan.

The United States and its allies also find themselves with a conundrum when it comes to Taiwan. It is a liberal open democracy and the world’s leading manufacturer of computer chips. It also sits in the middle of what military strategists call the “first island chain” stretching from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. Its strategic importance is profound. But having adopted a “one-China policy” since 1979, the United States’ security guarantee is conditional and tenuous. Reflecting growing unease over China’s actions, several polls show strong US support for Taiwan’s defense.

China, however, does not want war, at least not yet across the region, let alone Taiwan. He is playing the game long haul and his obvious intentions have become more annoying, despite controlling Taiwan’s airspace and despite believing that it is provocative of the United States to sell weapons. in Taiwan and to navigate its ships near the Taiwan Strait.

For academics like Brendan Taylor, they identified three flashpoints for a possible conflict in China other than Taiwan. They are with Korea, in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea, but conventional war is not likely at this point.

Although, just south of Korea in the East China Sea, China has stepped up military activities around the Japanese-claimed but uninhabited Senkaku Islands. China appears to be weakening Japan’s resolve to resist its claims to what it calls the Diaoyu Islands.

Likewise, the construction of an industrial-scale Chinese island in the South China Sea resulted in the creation of significant military equipment and infrastructure. This will allow the Chinese to consolidate their position militarily and assert control over the so-called nine-dash line – its vast claim over most of the sea.

The US Navy, however, continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) at sea to challenge China’s claims. With thousands of marked and unmarked Chinese ships operating there, however, the risk of an accident triggering an escalation is real.

The proof for China to avoid an “outright war” is that it obviously considers it preferable to operate a paramilitary force with ships painted white and fishing boats armed by the thousands to assert its rights. claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and restrict Taiwan’s freedom of action.

China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold of open war and refuses to present “a nail to the American hammer.” This is for good reason. This is why, it even adopted a new law, allowing its coast guard to act more like a military body and to apply maritime law, but this is in violation of the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea.

If war broke out, China would be vulnerable. To begin with, it shares a land border with fourteen countries, which represents the potential for increased challenges, even open attack on many fronts.

Naveed Qazi is the author of six books and the publisher of Globe Upfront. For comments, it can be sent by mail to [email protected] The opinions expressed are those of the author.

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