“The weak are beaten” declared Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2004 after the Beslan tragedy.

New Russia recently unveiled National security strategy bears the imprint of Putin’s worldview.

It is not a groundbreaking document, but it builds on familiar themes identified in its 2015 predecessor, produced in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, and Russia’s estrangement from the United States and Europe.

Still, it’s more than an update: there are revealing changes in substance and tone. The Strategy details, in forceful and virulent terms, the panoply of threats facing Russia much more explicitly than the previous document. It reveals the Kremlin’s comprehensive vision of national security, encompassing not only national defense but also economy and commerce, science and technology, environment, public welfare and culture. Added to this is information security.

The Strategy describes a changing world, characterized by increasing geopolitical instability and tensions and weakened multilateral institutions. Unsurprisingly, the United States is blamed for these tensions and accused of trying to preserve its hegemony in a context of imbalance in global power relations and a “weakening of the Western liberal model”.

Russia, meanwhile, is thrown into the familiar role of victim. The narrative of increasing pressure from the United States and its allies to contain and undermine Russia is woven throughout the Strategy.

Domestically, the Kremlin denounces external interference by the United States and its allies, but also by tech giants and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), exploiting social and economic problems and supporting protest movements, aimed at to stir up unrest and destabilize Russian society. Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values ​​are allegedly under attack by Western governments and media seeking to impose foreign ideas. This risks eroding Russia’s cultural sovereignty, polarizing society and undermining political stability.

Economically, Russia ostensibly faces “open political and economic pressure” designed to curb it, including sanctions, unfair competition rules and protectionism, limiting Russia’s access to export markets. Moscow denounces the efforts of “hostile states” to isolate Russia and the use of “double standards”, hampering effective multilateral cooperation to address global challenges.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin sees efforts to paint a “hostile image” of Russia abroad, falsifying and distorting world history and Russia’s place in it. Russia is “unreasonably accused of violating its international obligations, carrying out cyber attacks and intervening in other countries.”

What does the Strategy tell us about Russia’s future security settings? Expect more of the same – if not worse.

The “securing” of all aspects of national life in Russia reveals the regime’s underlying suspicions and insecurity, seeing foreign-inspired threats everywhere and everywhere. The state of mind of the Kremlin has hardened. There is no reason to anticipate a rapid change in Moscow’s combative and earthy approach to its relations with the West. Instead, Russia is doubling down.

This does not exclude limited cooperation in areas that Moscow deems opportune – for example, nuclear arms control or climate change, on which the Strategy confirms a change of position by the Kremlin, with a greater recognition now of the risks that it faces. ‘they put. But that will probably be the exception, not the rule.

Beyond the sustained efforts to expand and improve Russia’s military capabilities, efforts will continue to strengthen Russia’s resilience and domestic capabilities, reducing reliance on imported products and technology. So expect further steps from Russia to protect itself from sanctions by increasing its food self-sufficiency. Moscow will aim to modernize its industry and agriculture by moving up the processing value chain and integrating national technology. And Russia will try to reduce its exposure to the US dollar-dominated financial payments system and impose tighter controls on foreign investment.

While the Kremlin may engage with the United States on cybersecurity issues, it is unlikely that there will be much of a slowdown in Russia’s information warfare with Western countries – seeking to undermine it. opponent from within.

Nationally, expect firm and continued action to quell dissent and protests, impose internet controls, and instill traditional and patriotic values.

Asia continues to occupy an important place in Moscow’s international calculations.

The hierarchy of Russia’s Key Relations Strategy remains unchanged. Unsurprisingly, neighboring former Soviet states around the periphery of Russia take the top spot.

Second, develop both the “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction with China” and the “particularly privileged strategic partnership with India” – including the creation of “reliable mechanisms to ensure regional security and stability over a period of time. base not aligned ”.

The bracketing of China and India signals the geopolitical balance (and coverage?) That Moscow aims to achieve in these relations. And including both China and India in the context of Russia’s long-standing call for an effective but unaligned regional security framework underscores Moscow’s rejection of the concept of a quadrilateral dialogue on the safety (the Quad).

Deepen cooperation within non-Western multilateral groupings, including the BRICS economies, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Russia-India-China trilateral format is a priority.

It is also significant that, unlike 2015, Antarctica is listed among Russia’s priorities, alongside the Arctic.

But the absence of specific reference to relations with the United States or the European Union, also unlike 2015, is revealing. This indicates that the Kremlin expects little improvement in these relations.

What this latest national security strategy tells us, then, is that Russia will continue to vigorously assert its power, influence and relevance globally, often in ways that make it a thorny and difficult partner for Western countries.